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A FIXED STAR IN SHIFTING SKIES:
BARNETTE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
Leslie Kendrick*
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the
Court invoked one of its own precedents for an idea that at first glance seems
mundane: “Just as ‘no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,’ it is
not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to
prescribe what shall be offensive.”1
The Court’s language and sentiment draw from Justice Jackson’s
famous words on compelled speech in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.2
The Barnette Court offered this neutrality principle as the reason that a school
board could not compel schoolchildren to say the Pledge of Allegiance, a
reversal of the Court’s holding on the same issue from only three years
before.3 The Barnette Court treated its neutrality principle as both bedrock
constitutional law and an absolute. The Barnette neutrality maxim has
received criticism, however, for being both mistaken and overly broad and
robust. On the first count, some have suggested that the liberal ideal of state
neutrality reflected in Barnette is incoherent: a state committed to neutrality
is committed to neutrality as a value, which is at odds with entire idea of the
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Dean and David H. Ibbeken ‘71 Research Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of
Law. The author would like to thank Anna Noone, Micah Schwartzman, Elizabeth Sepper, Howard
Wasserman, and the participants and students at the FIU Law Review Symposium on Barnette at 75.
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018)
(quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. By way of noting a possible exception, in a footnote following this
sentence, the Court observed that those in military service, including those drafted into it, “are under many
duties and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life.” Id. at 642
n.19.
3 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding mandatory Pledge of
Allegiance).
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state being neutral.4 On the second, there is great disagreement about the
scope of the maxim and its robustness within its scope.5 Some have expressed
doubt that a prohibition on compelled speech is a required, or even desirable,
feature of a right of freedom of speech.6 Others have suggested that the
prescription of state neutrality inherent in Barnette is too broad or too strong.7
Even as some criticize Barnette, its scope continues to expand.
Masterpiece contains no fewer than three new deployments of Barnette. One
is a central claim in the litigation, that cake baking is speech and therefore
protected by the Barnette principle from interference by the government.8
One is the Supreme Court’s deployment of Barnette in its disposition of the
case, which suggested that the Colorado courts violated Barnette in how they
handled the complaint in Masterpiece. One is an argument made by some of
petitioner’s amici but not explicitly embraced by the Court, which implies
that Barnette means that civil rights law is constitutionally suspect. All of
these neutrality arguments will arise again. All pit the First Amendment
against other long-standing legal principles.
I.
The first deployment of Barnette in Masterpiece was part of the First
Amendment speech claims at the center of the litigation in the lower courts.
The petitioner-baker argued that making wedding cakes constituted “speech”
under the First Amendment and that therefore being required under Colorado
civil rights law to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple constituted
compelled speech in violation of the constitution. The baker claimed that his
being required to make a cake for the couple’s wedding was akin to
4

See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005).

On the importance of considering the scope of First Amendment rules, see, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
5

6

Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006).

For example, government entities argue that the First Amendment’s existing neutrality principle
does not recognize the non-invidious reasons that states and municipalities might have to treat different
content differently. This view is on display, for instance, in litigation regarding local signage ordinances.
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). It is also in play in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), where the city contended that it had to exempt labor picketing
from a buffer zone around schools to comply with the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, concluded that the labor exemption made the ordinance impermissibly
non-neutral. Id. Some Supreme Court Justices have suggested that the application of the neutrality
principle should be more flexible. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (with Justices Kagan and Breyer
endorsing a balancing test); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (same); Bartnicki v. Vopper,
532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (with Justice Stevens noting issues on “both sides of the constitutional
calculus”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 431 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (with Stevens
proposing a five-factor “constitutional calculus” to replace the current approach).
7

8

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018).
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schoolchildren in West Virginia being required to say the Pledge of
Allegiance.
Throughout the course of the litigation, both parties and commentators
assumed that the free-speech issue would determine the outcome, but in oral
argument it became clear that the petitioner’s claim that he had suffered
religious discrimination preoccupied several of the Justices. The Court’s
opinion ultimately hinged on freedom of religion, not freedom of speech. The
Court determined that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission exhibited
religious animus toward the baker in disposing of the case.9 The Court did,
however, address the speech question briefly, in order to urge caution:
The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few
persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have
thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.
This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition
that the application of constitutional freedoms in new
contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning.
One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree
as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a
baker refused to design a special cake with words or images
celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing
words with religious meaning—that might be different from
a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker’s
creation can be protected, these details might make a
difference.10
The Court then turned away from the speech question, because it found
the religious animus issue clearer. Nevertheless, the Court’s dictum suggests
that the speech question will return to the Supreme Court, as it already has in
lower courts.
Much has been written, and will continue to be written, about whether
commercial services open to the public should count as “speech” for purposes
of freedom of speech.11 This is not my major theme here, except to observe
that, if such activities and their regulation by standard public
accommodations laws did implicate the First Amendment, then litigation in
the civil rights era would have looked very different. At the time, litigants
who could have claimed their activities were speech did not do so, because
9
10

Id. at 1736–37, 1740.
Id. at 1723.

See Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639 (2019);
Abner S. Greene, Barnette and Masterpiece Cakeshop: Some Unanswered Questions, 13 FIU L. REV. 667
(2019).
11
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the claim at the time seemed so incredibly far-fetched. Now, litigants argue
that their activities are inherently “speech” for purposes of freedom of speech
or that, as the Court suggests, their activities are sometimes “speech,” such
as when there is writing on a cake or a discussion about cake design.12 To
start down this road is to reconfigure what has been considered a purely
commercial realm subject to civil rights laws into a hodge-podge where some
commercial actors can claim immunity to the extent that they can
characterize their activities as speech. This is an extraordinary step. It is
consistent with other current efforts to utilize the First Amendment to
deregulate the commercial sphere, and it also undermines a core settlement
of the civil rights era. The duty of Ollie’s Barbeque to serve AfricanAmericans does not, and should not, turn on whether the restaurant is serving
precooked food or catering a customized lunch.13 The duty of Heart of
Atlanta Motel to serve African-Americans does not, and should not, turn on
whether the hotel is being asked to rent a room to a traveler or to host a
wedding.14 The duty of a baker to serve customers regardless of sexual
orientation does not, and should not, turn on whether there is writing on the
cake.
II.
While the Supreme Court declined to decide the Barnette issue that
dominated the litigation, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion deployed
Barnette another way. In reversing the Colorado disposition of the case, the
Supreme Court held that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had
exhibited animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. In finding animus, the
Court relied partly on a perceived difference between Colorado’s treatment
of the same sex couple’s complaint against Phillips and its treatment of three
other complaints made by an individual named William Jack, who had
unsuccessfully asked various bakers to prepare cakes featuring anti-gay Bible
verses or an image of a same-sex couple with a red line through it. The
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had found a civil rights violation in the
same sex couple’s case but not in Jack’s cases, and the Supreme Court took
issue with how the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Court of
Appeals of Colorado had explained the difference between these cases. The
12 During oral argument, Justice Sotomayor asked the plaintiff’s attorney whether the compelled
speech argument would apply to a cake bought off the shelf. The attorney conceded that “under [his]
theory, [the plaintiff] would need to sell that cake because he’s already created that cake with the message
that he intended for it,” indicating that the plaintiff believed that line determining when a cake may be
speech is not even as clear as writing on the cake. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
13

Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964).

14

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964).
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Colorado Civil Rights Commission had found a civil rights violation in the
former but not the latter. On appeal in the same-sex couple’s case, the Court
of Appeals of Colorado, in a footnote, summarized and approved the Civil
Rights Commission’s determinations:
The Division found that the bakeries did not refuse [Jack’s]
request because of his creed, but rather because of the
offensive nature of the requested message. Importantly,
there was no evidence that the bakeries based their decisions
on the patron’s religion, and evidence had established that
all three regularly created cakes with Christian themes.
Conversely, Masterpiece admits that its decision to refuse
Craig’s and Mullins’ requested wedding cake was because
of its opposition to same-sex marriage which, based on
Supreme Court precedent, we conclude is tantamount to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.15
It was this language that prompted the Supreme Court to deploy
Barnette. According to the Supreme Court, this statement by the Court of
Appeals was tantamount to the state of Colorado deciding for itself what was
offensive.16 In the Court’s words, “The Colorado court’s attempt to account
for the difference in treatment [between the Jack cases and the Craig and
Mullins case] elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself
sends a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”17 In the
Supreme Court’s view, this bolstered its finding of animus. 18
More could be said about this holding as a matter of animus doctrine,
but more important for present purposes is that seven Justices thought this an
appropriate occasion to invoke the “fixed star in our constitutional
constellation” that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”19 In the Supreme
Court’s view, the Colorado Court of Appeals judged Jack’s proposed cakes
to be offensive, in violation of the Barnette maxim of state neutrality.
Purely as a matter of interpretation, this seems implausible. The Court
of Appeals noted that the Civil Rights Commission found that “the bakeries
did not refuse [Jack’s] request because of his creed, but rather because of the

15

Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 n.8 (Colo. App. 2015).

16

Id.

17

Masterpiece’, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.

Id. (stating that the Colorado court failed to “answer the baker’s concern that the State’s practice
was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection.”).
18
19

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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offensive nature of the requested message.”20 The bakers were the parties said
to have found Jack’s proposals offensive and to have acted on that basis. The
Civil Rights Commission opinions cited by the Court of Appeals footnote
make this clear: for example, one reads, “Respondent [baker] . . . avers that
the cake order . . . was denied because the cakes included what was deemed
to contain ‘offensive’ or ‘derogatory’ messages and imagery.”21 The Civil
Rights Commission made factual findings about the bakers’ reasons for
denying service, and the Court of Appeals in turn recounted the sequence of
events. The quoted passage does not say that the Civil Rights Commission or
the Court of Appeals themselves judged the messages offensive. At most, one
might argue that the Court of Appeals impliedly endorsed this finding by
referring to the “offensive nature” of Jack’s requests. But this is a strained
interpretation. In context, the court is reporting the bakers’ reasons, not
adopting those reasons itself.22
As a legal matter, this interpretation is far the superior one. Civil rights
enforcement demands that decision-making bodies sometimes make findings
about the grounds for denials of service, and this can include offensiveness.
Anti-discrimination laws prohibit places of public accommodation from
refusing service on the basis of a protected status—in Colorado, “sexual
orientation, religion, disability, race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin or
ancestry.”23 Other refusals of service are permissible, so long as they do not
violate other law. A baker can refuse a patron who is not wearing shoes or a
shirt, who is unruly or threatening, or who requests a design that is offensive,
if these actions do not also implicate a protected status. Because some denials
of service are permissible and some are not, decision-making bodies will
regularly have to determine the reasons behind denial of service when
assessing claims under anti-discrimination laws.
That is precisely what occurred in Masterpiece and the Jack cases. In
Masterpiece, Phillips argued, among other things, that he did not engage in
proscribed discrimination: he merely refused service because he found the
message of the proposed cake offensive. But the Colorado courts held that,
because Phillips would have provided the exact same product—a wedding
cake—to an opposite-sex couple, his denial of that product to a same-sex
couple constituted impermissible discrimination. Meanwhile, Jack argued
that he was denied service not because his cakes were offensive, but because
of his religious beliefs. The Colorado courts, however, found that the bakers
refused to make the cakes because they found them offensive, and they would
20

Craig, 370 P.3d at 282 n.8.

21

Id. (citing Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Colo. Civil Rights Div., Mar. 24,

2015)).
22

See id.

23

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2018).

2019]

A Fixed Star in Shifting Skies

735

have refused anyone who asked for those cakes. In both instances, the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission had to distinguish between prohibited
discrimination (based on the identity of the customer) and a permissible
denial of service (based on the offensiveness of the design).
Whether or not one agrees about the ultimate disposition of the cases,24
the Supreme Court’s contention in Masterpiece cannot be correct: it cannot
be that by assessing whether a commercial actor denied service because of
an offensive message, the state is itself adjudicating offensiveness.
Otherwise, the regular enforcement of civil rights laws would be
impermissible under Barnette. The Court’s position would suggest that any
time the state finds a reason for a denial of service, that reason must be
imputed to the state. Thus, if a court found that a baker denied service because
a customer was not wearing a shirt, the state would be taken to oppose
shirtlessness, and the question would become whether shirtlessness is the
kind of thing upon which the state can have a view. Similarly, if a Christian
bookstore refused a customer request to order other religious materials, on
the ground that the store was focused only on Christian works, a civil rights
division assessment that this was a permissible denial of service would look,
on the Court’s view, like an unconstitutional religious endorsement.25 This is
to confuse the reasons of private actors for the position of the state.
The majority’s stance has implications far beyond civil rights law. The
state enforces many laws that permit private individuals to do things that the
state itself could not do. Public accommodations’ ability to deny service on
the basis of offensiveness is only one example. A private homeowner can
deny access to real property for virtually unlimited reasons, including racism,
sexism, religious discrimination, and many other bases on which the state is
not permitted to act. The state, by enforcing trespass law, does not thereby
acquire the motives or reasons of the homeowner. To say otherwise is to
overwrite state action doctrine.
Of course, some cases have challenged the line between public and
private. In Shelley v. Kramer, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that
Missouri’s enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted state
action in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 In the white primary
cases,27 the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the discriminatory
practices of a private political party violated Equal Protection because the

24 For further analysis, see Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132
HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018).
25

I thank Liz Sepper for the example.

26

334 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1948).

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
27
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party acted under a delegation of power from the state.28 The line between
private and public action is not always clean, and none of this is to take a
position on where the line ought to be. Descriptively speaking, however,
placing the actions of Colorado in Masterpiece in the same category as
Shelley and the white primary cases would make Masterpiece a highly
exceptional and momentous decision. It seems unlikely that the Supreme
Court would take such a step in passing.
The existence of civil rights laws makes it incumbent upon the state to
differentiate between permissible denials of service and impermissible
discrimination. That is what Colorado was doing here. If courts’ conclusions
about the reasons of private actors were imputed to the state, enforcement of
civil rights law would be impossible.
III.
There is a final Barnette issue lurking in Masterpiece, not expressly
endorsed by the opinion but presented to the Court in the litigation. Some
advocates and interested groups were willing to make a larger claim, not just
that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) was invalid in its
application to Phillips but that all civil rights laws are suspect. For example,
amicus Christian Legal Society (CLS) argued that the state of Colorado had
no compelling interest in its civil rights law, because (1) Craig and Mullins
were not economically harmed by the refusal of service (because other
bakeries were willing to provide them cakes—indeed, they received one for
free) and (2) purely dignitary harm is not a compelling reason to enforce antidiscrimination laws.29
On this view, anti-discrimination laws such as CADA protect against
two types of harms: (1) the economic harm that occurs when an individual is
denied access to the marketplace by virtue of discrimination and (2) the
dignitary harm involved in being denied service on the same terms as other
individuals. On CLS’s argument, Craig and Mullins suffered no economic
harm because other bakers were willing to serve them when Phillips was not.
Meanwhile, according to CLS, dignitary harm is not a legitimate basis on
which to regulate. According to CLS:
The argument from dignitary harm to individuals is, at
bottom, an argument that petitioner’s religious practice must
be suppressed because it offends the customer turned away.
That argument is at odds with the whole First Amendment
28

See Allwright, 321 U.S. at 663–64; Nixon, 286 U.S. at 89.

See Brief of Amicus Christian Legal Society at 30–32, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
29
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tradition. It is settled that offensiveness is not a compelling
interest that can justify suppressing speech.30
According to CLS, the harm involved is that the customer who turned
away will be offended by the denial of service. Thus, protecting against
dignitary harm is tantamount to protecting customers from being offended.
Protecting people from offense is not a compelling state interest, and thus
protecting individuals and groups from the dignitary harm of discrimination
is not a legitimate basis for enforcing civil rights law.
This view of the harms of discrimination has far-reaching implications.
It would seem to argue that any application of anti-discrimination law to
religious businesses denying service to gays and lesbians would be
unconstitutional, so long as they can find similar services elsewhere in the
market. Moreover, religious businesses such as Piggie Park would also seem
to enjoy immunity from civil rights laws compelling service for AfricanAmericans.31 So long as other businesses were willing to serve them, AfricanAmerican customers, like same-sex couples, would have no claim against
religious owners refusing service. This goes far beyond a finding of animus
in a particular case to the conclusion that anti-discrimination laws are
generally unenforceable, so long as some businesses are willing to provide
service.
Nor do the implications stop there. CLS argues that dignitary harms
cannot serve as a compelling interest—and that, therefore, CADA fails strict
scrutiny. But the upshot of the argument extends further. Not only is
“offensiveness” not a compelling state interest in free speech law, but it is
generally an illegitimate ground for speech regulation. As Barnette says, “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion.”32 The Court has affirmed many times
since Barnette that laws regulating speech on the basis of offensiveness
trigger strict scrutiny and generally will not survive.33 The implication here
is that civil rights laws—to the extent that they seek to protect patrons against
the dignitary harm of being denied service on the basis of race, gender,
religion, sexual orientation, and so forth—are unconstitutional under
Barnette.
This view has cropped up before, notably in Supreme Court litigation in
which CLS took the position that a University civil rights provision
30

Id. at 31.

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 403 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (summarily
rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a civil rights law).
31
32

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
33
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prohibiting discrimination by student organizations on the basis of race,
gender, religion, sexual orientation, and so forth would have amounted to
impermissible viewpoint discrimination on the part of the University.34 This
view, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would mean that civil rights laws are
themselves a First Amendment violation.
One set of conceptual mistakes behind this position involves the harms
of discrimination. Its conception of economic harm ignores the harms that go
along with inferior treatment in the market.35 It suggests that, so long as the
putative consumer can find some willing sellers, the consumer cannot assert
a market-related harm. This ignores the long history of market discrimination
that compelled African-Americans in the Jim Crow South to share
information about which businesses would serve them.36 It also ignores the
fact that various forms of market discrimination in the Jim Crow South did
not involve outright denial of service. On this view, Rosa Parks did not suffer
an economic harm by having to sit at the back of the bus or enter a restaurant
by the back door.
At the same time, the CLS position reduces dignitary harm entirely to
mere offense. The non-economic harms of discrimination can come in many
guises, and though they may be offensive, that is not all they are.37 The Jim
Crow regime was offensive to those subject to it, but reducing its harms to
offensiveness ignores the grave wrong of the expression of state-sanctioned
racism. Purportedly equal citizens receiving unequal treatment in public
businesses and other public places is not simply, or even primarily, a matter
of offense.
Another conceptual error concerns the First Amendment: it is a failure
to distinguish speech from conduct or, more precisely, to distinguish laws
directed at expression from laws directed at non-expressive harms. In
suggesting that civil rights laws impermissibly regulate based on
“offensiveness,” CLS’s argument suggests that these laws regulate speech,
rather than conduct—that is, the provision of service. The Supreme Court has
roundly rejected this view in several contexts. It rejected it without comment
in a case where litigants argued that Title VII’s prohibition of sexual
34

Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668–69 (2010).

See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
129 (2015); Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 193, 211
(2015).
35

36 See, e.g., Jacinda Townsend, How the Green Book Helped African-American Tourists Navigate
a Segregated Nation, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonianinstitution/history-green-book-african-american-travelers-180958506/.
37 There is an extensive literature on the wrongs of discrimination, which includes much more
thorough explications of dignitary harm than that offered here. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS
DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008); Elizabeth Sepper, A Missing Piece of the Puzzle of the Dignitary Torts,
104 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2019).
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harassment in the workplace violated the First Amendment.38 It rejected it in
the context of hate crime legislation, which a defendant cast as simply
penalizing him based on “viewpoint.”39 It rejected it when law schools
objected to admitting military recruiters on free-speech grounds: there, the
Court concluded that there was no free-speech claim at all, because the law
at issue compelled conduct rather than speech.40
Moreover, this must be true in order to prevent the freedom of speech
from devouring the entire legal code. Public nudity laws take the view that
public nudity is offensive to most people.41 Murder laws take the position that
murder is bad and protect all persons from the dignitary harm of being
murdered. Child neglect laws take the position that child neglect is bad and
protect children from the dignitary harm of neglect. Tort law takes the
position that tortiously injuring another is bad and protects all persons from
the dignitary harm of being tortiously injured. Most of these laws have other
justifications as well, but constitutional jurisprudence has never suggested
that their expressive function is illegitimate. CLS’s position would suggest
that it is.
CLS puts its arguments in terms of compelling interest: it argues that
protection against dignitary harms is not a compelling interest that would
overcome the First Amendment interests of the baker. But the logical
implication of the position is that civil rights protections violate the First
Amendment. Nothing about Justice Jackson’s view in Barnette compels this
position. Nothing about Justice Jackson’s view would support this position:
Barnette, in all its 75 years, has never been taken to suggest that civil rights
laws are unconstitutional. But its applications continue to evolve, as its three
manifestations in one recent case illustrate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Masterpiece highlights the encroachment of Barnette’s neutrality
principle into new areas. The litigation suggested that commercial enterprises
that can plausibly describe themselves as involving speech should have
immunity from general regulations. The Supreme Court majority held that a
court’s assessment that a business discriminated on the basis of offensiveness
violated Barnette. And petitioners’ amicus suggested that civil rights laws
themselves are unconstitutional violations of a neutrality principle. None of

38

See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

39

See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).

40

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).

Cf. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (upholding public nudity law as
applied to nude dancing establishment).
41
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these positions was contemplated by Barnette itself, and none is compelled
by its holding. However fixed Barnette’s star, the skies around it have shifted.

